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Abstract For over 15 years, the reports of the EEA Agreement’s imminent
demise have proven to be greatly exaggerated. In this article it is argued that
a great deal of the credit for this accomplishment is due to the EFTA Court.
Through a distinctly dynamic approach to the Agreement, the EFTA Court
has been able to convince an initially sceptical ECJ that the goal of extending
the internal market to include the EFTA States is actually achievable. For the
EFTA States, the consequence is a more ‘supranational’ EEA Agreement
than originally conceived. Further, it is shown that the EFTA Court appears,
in hard cases, to lean even further towards teleological (ie integrationist)
interpretation than the ECJ. It is suggested that this may be due to to struc-
tural imbalances between the two EEA courts, the EFTA Court’s desire to
prove its independence from the EFTA States and its quest for recognition
from the ECJ.
I. INTRODUCTION
The 15th anniversary (1994–2009) of the Agreement on the European
Economic Area (EEA)1 seems an appropriate occasion on which to assess the
EFTA Court’s contribution to the Agreement (almost against all odds) having
reached such a respectable age.2
With respect to the legal effect of EEA law at the national level, there
is general consensus that the Agreement has developed in a ‘supranational’
direction during the course of the past 15 years, and that this can primarily be
attributed to dynamic interpretation by the EFTA Court.3 We do, however,
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lack any real explanation for why the EFTA Court has preferred to take a
distinctly dynamic approach. As regards the interpretation of the substantive
content of the common EEA rules, it seems that not only is the EFTA Court
careful to avoid EEA-specific solutions that would give the EFTA States
greater political leeway than the EU Member States, but—it is argued in this
article—in ‘hard cases’ it appears to lean even further towards teleological
(ie integrationist) interpretation than does the Court of Justice of the European
Communities (ECJ).
In parallel with the EFTA Court’s dynamic development of EEA law, a
form of dialogue appears to have evolved between the EFTA Court and the
ECJ, in which the latter seem to regard EFTA Court case-law as a relevant
source for interpreting EEA-relevant EU law. Moreover, the ECJ appears to
have changed its attitude to the EEA Agreement, from one of considerable
scepticism to a recognition that the goal of extending the internal market to
include the EFTA States is actually achievable.
Whether there is any connection between the EFTA Court’s dynamic in-
terpretation of EEA law and the ECJ’s changed perception of both the EFTA
Court and the EEA Agreement is a key question. My thesis is that the EFTA
Court’s development of EEA law over the last 15 years can be understood as
an enduring attempt to convince an initially sceptical ECJ that the EEA
Agreement is a viable structure. In the following, I will argue that the EFTA
Court has acknowledged that the fate of the EEA Agreement hangs on its
acceptance by the ECJ. Moreover, the EFTA Court has been aware that the
ECJ, in its consideration of the internal effect that an international treaty such
as the EEA Agreement should be given in the Community (now EU) legal
order, appears to attach importance to how effective it has become in the other
Contracting Parties’ legal systems. Based on the consideration of reciprocity,
the development of EEA law in a ‘supranational’ and integration-friendly
direction will increase the likelihood of the ECJ granting the same rights in the
common market to individuals and market operators residing in the EFTA
States as to operators residing in the EU. Further, the EFTA Court has been
eager to dispel any suspicion the ECJ may have had as to its independence:
Established and financed by the EFTA States and made up of judges appointed
by their governments alone, the EFTA Court has been anxious to be percieved
by the ECJ as an independent court and guarantor of the EFTA States’ fulfil-
ment of their obligations under the EEA Agreement.
In the following, I will attempt to support this thesis through an analysis of
EFTA Court case-law from the beginning of 1994 up until the present
(section IV). In continuation of this review, I will attempt to demonstrate
that the Court’s strategy seems to have caused the ECJ to change its view of
the EEA Agreement (section V). Firstly, however, it is pertinent to review
the seemingly impossible task the EFTA Court was set (section II), and to
substantiate the claim that the ECJ was originally rather sceptical of the whole
EEA structure (section III).
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II. THE CHALLENGE: A HOMOGENEOUS EEA
The task the EFTA Court was charged with on its inception in 1994 can with
some truth be described as a ‘Mission Impossible’.4 After the refusal by the
ECJ in 1991 to approve the original plan for a joint EEA Court,5 the end result
was two independent courts at the international level, the EFTA Court and the
ECJ, interpreting the common EEA rules. As the EFTA Court itself remarked
in the L’Oréal case from 2008, it is ‘an inherent consequence of such a system
that from time to time the two courts may come to different conclusions in
their interpretation of the rules.’6 In order to reduce this risk to a minimum, the
EFTA Court is obliged by article 6 EEA to conform with ECJ case-law prior
to the date of signature of the Agreement (1 May 1992) and by article 3(2)
of the Agreement between the EFTA States on the establishment of a
Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice (Surveillance and Court
Agreement—SCA)7 to pay due account to subsequent case-law. However, in
cases in which no clarifying ECJ case-law exists, the EFTA Court is in reality
left with identifying to the best of its ability how the ECJ would have dealt
with the submitted interpretation issue.
The challenge faced by the EFTA Court is further intensified because the
EEA Agreement contains no corresponding obligation on the part of the ECJ
to give consideration to EFTA Court case-law. In its opinion on the original
draft agreement, the ECJ stated clearly that such a duty would be incompatible
with its sole competence to determine the content of Community (now EU)
law.
This structural imbalance between the EFTA Court and the ECJ increases
when we consider that the EEA Agreement’s objective of a homogeneous
EEA is not limited to uniform interpretation of the EEA rules as such,
but also—and in practice much more importantly—aims to achieve legal
homogeneity between the EEA rules and the ECJ’s interpretation of the
underlying EU law. During the EEA negotiations, the EFTA States were very
much aware that in Polydor and Kupferberg the ECJ had interpreted the pro-
visions of the free trade agreement between the then EC and the then EFTA
State Portugal differently from the virtually identically worded provisions in
the EC Treaty, with justification in the different aims of the two treaties.8 For
the EFTA States, it was therefore imperative to ensure that the ECJ would
interpret the EEA rules in conformity with its interpretation of identically
worded provisions in EU law. Concerning ECJ case-law prior to signature of
the Agreement, this was to be safeguarded under article 6 EEA.9 This pro-
vision did not, however, provide any guarantee that the ECJ would continue to
4 Graver (n 3). 5 Opinion 1/91 [1991] ECR I-6079.
6 Joined cases E-9/07 and E-10/07 L’Oréal [2008] EFTA Ct Rep 258, para 28.
7 OJ [1994] L 344, 3.
8 Cases 270/80 Polydor [1982] ECR 329 and 104/81 Kupferberg [1982] ECR 3641.
9 Jf. H Bull Det indre marked for tjenester og kapital (Universitetsforlaget, Oslo, 2002) 81.
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interpret EEA law in accordance with subsequent case-law—guidance from
the drafters of the Agreement on this matter is limited to a statement in the
fifteenth paragraph of the preamble that ‘in full deference to the independence
of the courts’ the objective is ‘to arrive at and maintain’ a uniform interpret-
ation of EEA law and the underlying Community law.
From the point of view of the EFTA Court, it was (and still is) a cause for
concern that the ECJ has introduced reciprocity between the contracting par-
ties’ obligations as a consideration when interpreting international agreements
signed by the EU. There is good reason to believe that the refusal of the EFTA
States and their courts to give direct effect to the provisions of their bilateral
free-trade agreements with the EC contributed to the ECJ’s position in
Polydor and Kupferberg. Further, in its judgment in Portugal v Council of
1999, the ECJ refused to allow the WTO rules direct effect in the EU on the
grounds that they did not have the same effect in ‘some of the contracting
parties, which are among the most important commercial partners of the
Community’.10 The ECJ pointed out that the WTO agreements are ‘based on
reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements’ and that lack of reci-
procity with respect to the application of the rules in the contracting parties’
internal law could lead to ‘disuniform application of the WTO rules’ (para-
graph 45). This approach is relevant in the EEA context, as the fourth para-
graph of the preamble states that the EEA Agreement was entered into ‘on the
basis of equality and reciprocity and of an overall balance of benefits, rights
and obligations for the Contracting Parties’. During the EEA negotiations it
was important for the EC and its Member States to ensure that the EFTA states
could not choose the benefits with full market rights but reject the obligations
that the EU Member States have to live with (‘cherry picking’).11
This reciprocity consideration links the effect of EEA law in the EU to the
sensitive issue of the effect of EEA law in the legal orders of the dualistic
EFTA States. The EFTA Court appears to have been far more aware of this
link than has academic proponents. Tellingly, it is primarily authors with
connections to the EFTA Court—including the Court’s former president
Sevón, former judge Norberg and current president Baudenbacher—who have
introduced reciprocity into the interpretation of EEA law.12 For the EFTA
Court, the challenge has always been to realise the goal of a homogeneous
EEA by balancing the EU and its Member States’ legitimate expectations of
reciprocity against the (Nordic) EFTA States’ precondition that the EEA
10 Case C-149/96 Portugal v Council [1999] ECR I-8395, para 43.
11 Sejersted et al (n 3) 85.
12 See L Sevón and M Johansson, ‘The Protection of the Rights of Individuals under
the EEA Agreement’ (1999) 24 ELRev 373, 385; S Norberg, ‘Perspectives on the Future
Development of the EEA’ in DT Björgvinsson et al (eds), Festschrift Tor Vilhjálmsson
(Bókaútgáfa Orator, Reykjavik, 2000) 367, 374; C Baudenbacher, ‘The EFTA Court Ten Years
On’ in C Baudenbacher et al (eds), The EFTA Court Ten Years On (Hart Publishing, Oxford and
Portland, Oregon, 2005) 13, 30.
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Agreement should not affect their dualistic approach to the relationship
between international obligations and national law. As Sevón warned, if the
ECJ were to deem the legal protection of the market operators in the EFTA
pillar of the EEA to be unequal to that offered in the EU, there would be a risk
of Polydor and Kupferberg gaining new currency.13
III. STARTING POINT: A SCEPTICAL ECJ
The task of the EFTA Court was not made easier by the fact that, even before
the EEA Agreement entered into force, the ECJ had openly expressed its
scepticism about the possibility of realising the goal of uniform interpretation
of EEA law and the underlying Community law. In Opinion 1/91 regarding
the original draft of the EEA Agreement, the ECJ emphasized the differences
between the EEA Agreement’s limited objective of market access and the
EEC Treaty’s objective of a European Union. Further, it stressed the differ-
ence between the natures of the two treaties, describing the EEA Agreement as
a treaty that ‘essentially only creates rights and obligations between the
Contracting Parties, and provides for no transfer of sovereign rights to the
inter-governmental institutions which it sets up’, in contrast to the EEC
Treaty, which was heralded as ‘the constitutional charter of a Community
based on the rule of law’ (paragraph 20). After rejecting the idea that the
linkage to earlier ECJ case-law pursuant to Article 6 EEA would suffice to
ensure future legal homogeneity, the ECJ concluded categorically that ‘the
divergences which exist between the aims and context of the agreement, on
the one hand, and the aims and context of Community law, on the other, stand
in the way of the achievement of the objective of homogeneity in the in-
terpretation and application of the law in the EEA’ (paragraph 29).
It has rightly been pointed out that the ECJ was clearly opposed to a com-
peting EEA Court,14 and that this was presumably why Opinion 1/91 focused
rather one-sidedly on the differences between Community law and EEA
law.15 The following year, when the ECJ in Opinion 1/92 accepted the re-
negotiated version of the EEA Agreement, the tone was friendlier.16 The
EFTA Court must nevertheless have noted that the ECJ pointed out that the
‘divergences’ still remained between the homogeneity objectives on the one
hand and the differences in purpose and context between the EEA Agreement
and Community law on the other (paragraphs 17–18). The ECJ’s conclusion
that the amended Agreement was compatible with Community law was not
due to a change of mind about the possibility of ensuring uniform interpret-
ation of EEA and Community law, but solely to the fact that there was no
13 L Sevón ‘The ECJ, the EFTA Court and the national courts of the EFTA countries’ in
P Lødrup et al (eds), Festschrift Carsten Smith (Universitetsforlaget, Oslo, 2000) 721, 731.
14 See eg, T Hartley ‘The European Court and the EEA’ (1992) 41 ICLQ 841, 847.
15 Sejersted et al (n 3) 105–106. 16 Opinion 1/92 [1992] ECR I-2821.
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longer a common EEA Court that could hamper the ECJ’s future interpret-
ation of Community law. The ECJ thus stressed that the EFTA Court ‘will
exercise its jurisdiction only within EFTA’ (paragraph 19). This was hardly to
be understood as an invitation to constructive judicial collaboration.
The EFTA Court’s position was further weakened, if not legally then at
least in practical terms, when the Swiss electorate voted against EEA par-
ticipation in a referendum in 1992 and even further when Finland, Sweden and
Austria joined the EU in 1995, just a year after the EEA Agreement finally
came into force. As regards the relative strength between the two EEA pillars,
the ratio has widened from an assumpted 12:7 when the ECJ published its
Opinion 1/92, to 15:3 in 1995, and even further to the present 27:3. Instead of
a medium-sized court taking cases from seven EFTA States, the EFTA Court
ended up with a minimum of three judges, jurisdiction over one small and two
tiny States and a disturbingly small number of cases. Moreover, considering
the fact that appointment and reappointment of the judges lies in the hands of
the Governments of the EFTA States alone (article 30 SCA), the independence
of the EFTA Court might be called into question if it were to be perceived as
more sympathetic to the arguments of government lawyers than is the ECJ.
IV. THE STRATEGY OF THE EFTA COURT: DYNAMIC INTERPRETATION OF EEA LAW
A. Ensuring the Effectiveness of EEA Law in the EFTA States
In the EFTA Court’s very first case, Restamark, the Commission argued in
favour of direct effect of the EEA Agreement.17 However, since the main part
of the Agreement had already been implemented in Finnish law, it sufficed for
the Court to point out that the Agreement’s Protocol 35 must be interpreted
such that individuals are entitled to invoke and claim at national level any
rights that could be derived from implemented provisions of the EEA Agree-
ment, provided they are unconditional and sufficiently precise.18 Referring to
the ECJ’s conclusion that the corresponding provision regarding State mono-
polies of a commercial character in article 31 EC (now 37 TFEU) satisfied
these criteria, the EFTA Court held that this should apply mutatis mutandis to
article 16 EEA. In the Restamark case, the consequence of this was that
a private importer was allowed, as is the case under EU law, to invoke a
provision in the main part of the EEA Agreement before a national court,
setting aside national legislation that established a monopoly on the import of
alcoholic beverages. Since the main part of the EEA Agreement had also been
implemented en bloc in the other dualistic EFTA States, the parity of the
contracting parties’ obligations had been fully safeguarded regardless of the
issue of direct effect. Tellingly, Baudenbacher has stated on a number of
17 Case E-1/95 Restamark [1994–1995] EFTA Ct Rep 35, Report for the Hearing, para 96.
18 Restamark (n 17), paras 77–81. Emphasis added.
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occasions that in Restamark the EFTA Court established ‘quasi-direct effect’
for the main part of the EEA Agreement.19
In the Einarsson case in 2002, the EFTA Court followed up the Restamark
approach by pointing out that Protocol 35 EEA requires the EFTA States,
where necessary, to adopt a special statutory provision ensuring the primacy
of implemented EEA provisions that confer rights on individuals in a suffi-
ciently precise and unconditional manner over other rules of law.20 Protocol
35 is not as such covered by the national implementation of the main part of
the EEA Agreement in the dualistic EFTA States, but must be deemed to
have been implemented in that the dualistic EFTA States have adopted
such primacy rules as prescribed in the Protocol.21 With reference to the
ECJ’s interpretation of the prohibition of discriminatory taxation in article
90 EC (now 110 TFEU), the EFTA Court found that the corresponding pro-
vision in article 14 EEA was sufficiently precise and unconditional to entitle
a private importer of foreign books to Iceland to demand that it should
take precedence over conflicting national rules prescribing different taxes
for Icelandic and foreign books. Through the national implementation of
Protocol 35, we can, again in the words of Baudenbacher, assert that in
Einarsson the EFTA Court established ‘quasi-primacy’ for implemented EEA
provisions.22
In Restamark and Einarsson, the EFTA Court managed to keep the balance
between the obligations of the contracting parties without impinging on the
Nordic EFTA States’ precondition that the EEA Agreement should not
undermine their dualistic approach to the relationship between international
obligations and national law. Far more controversial was the conclusion
in Sveinbjörnsdóttir that the EEA Agreement embraces a principle of State
liability for breach of EEA obligations.23 Where the breach consists of an
EEA provision not being (correctly) implemented in national law, one cannot
disregard the fact that State liability means that EEA rules that are not oper-
ative as such in national law nevertheless have internal legal effect.
The EFTA Court found justification for EEA State liability in the hom-
ogeneity objective, the objective regarding effective protection by law of
rights that the Agreement assigns to individuals and the duty of loyalty pur-
suant to article 3 EEA.24 Opinion is divided as to how convincing the EFTA
Court’s argumentation is on this point, but there can be no doubt that it
19 See eg, Baudenbacher (n 12) 26.
20 Case E-1/01 Einarsson [2002] EFTA Ct Rep 1, paras 47 ff.
21 In Norway through section 2 of the EEA Act of 27.11.1992 No 109. The Icelandic
implementation of Protocol 35 is less clear, but the Icelandic Supreme Court appears to have
remedied this, see T Örlygsson, ‘Iceland and the EFTA Court. Twelve years of experience’ in
M Monti et al (eds), Festschrift Carl Baudenbacher (Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2007) 225, 235–238.
22 Baudenbacher (n 12) 26.
23 Case E-9/97 Sveinbjörnsdóttir [1998] EFTA Ct Rep 95.
24 ibid paras 47–62.
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constitutes a clear example of judicial activism.25 Its relevance in the present
context is that extending the existence of State liability to the EFTA States
contributes to a greater degree of reciprocity between the obligations of the
Contracting Parties. From the point of view of the EU Member States, the risk
of liability as a result of breach of EU law obligations is a price they have to
pay for membership of the EU. Since the EEA Agreement forms an integral
part of EU law, the Member States—regardless of the existence of a specific
EEA liability—may also, within the scope of the EEA Agreement, incur
liability vis-à-vis market operators or individuals residing in one of the EFTA
States.
Thus, consideration of the overall balance in the obligations of the con-
tracting parties seems to be a key factor in understanding the EFTA Court’s
effect-oriented approach to the homogeneity objective in Sveinbjörnsdóttir.
The introduction of the EEA State liability shows clearly that in the opinion of
the EFTA Court the homogeneity objective is not limited to the interpretation
of the substantive content of the EEA provisions, but also embraces their
legal effects in national law.26 Moreover, Sveinbjörnsdóttir shows that the
EFTA Court also strives for homogeneity of effect in cases in which the
argumentation leading up to the corresponding result in EU law is not fully
applicable in the EEA context. In Sveinbjörnsdóttir, a direct transfer of the EU
law principle of State liability appeared problematic, as it had been closely
linked by the ECJ to the (then) European Community a supranational legal
order.27 The EFTA Court circumvented this link by establishing a specific
EEA liability,28 simultaneosly safeguarding the Agreement’s homogeneity
objective by ensuring that the content of the liability corresponds to that of the
Member States in the EU.
Neither in Sveinbjörnsdóttir nor in subsequent judgments has the EFTA
Court given any real justification for its effect-oriented understanding of the
homogeneity objective. The Court’s President has, however, on several sub-
sequent occasions explicitly linked the principle of State liability to the overall
balance between the obligations of the Contracting Parties.29
A further step in the ‘supranational’ direction was taken in the Karlsson
judgment in 2002, where the EFTA Court stated that EEA law imposes a duty
of EEA-consistent interpretation of national law.30 This standpoint means that
25 In the editorial ‘European Economic Area and European Community: Homogeneity of legal
orders?’ (1999) 36 CMLR 1999, 697, 691, the opinion is described as ‘fairly daring’.
26 This understanding of the homogeneity objective is controversial and hard to reconcile with
the preconditions of the dualistic EFTA States upon signing and ratification of the Agreement,
see further Bull (n 8) 78.
27 cf joined cases C-6/90 and C-9/90 Francovich [1991] ECR I-5357, para 31 and joined cases
C-46/93 and C-48/93 Brasserie du Pêcheur [1996] ECR I-1029, para 22.
28 This was clarified in the later case E-4/01 Karlsson [2002] EFTA Ct Rep 248, para 29.
29 See, most recently, C Baudenbacher,‘If Not EEA State Liability, Then What? Reflections
Ten Years after the EFTA Court’s Sveinbjörnsdóttir Ruling’ (2009) 10 Chicago JIL 333, 358.
30 Karlsson (n 28) para 28.
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the EEA Agreement as such31 obliges national courts to also take account of
EEA rules that are not operative in national law. The duty of EEA-consistent
interpretation is limited by ‘the interpretative methods recognised by national
law’,32 but this applies mutatis mutandis to the duty of consistent interpret-
ation of national law in the EU.33 The point in the present context is that, here
too, reciprocity is established between the obligations of the Contracting
Parties.
The EFTA Court’s dynamic development of the EEA Agreement found its
limits in the matter of direct effect and primacy of incorrectly implemented
directives. It is, however, perhaps the Court’s handling of this question that
evidences most clearly its awareness of how interpretation of the EEA
Agreement may be perceived by the ECJ. Tellingly, several of the authors
who argued that the principles of direct effect and primacy principles ought to
be seen as an integral part of the Agreement linked their view to the require-
ment of an overall balance between the objectives of the Contracting Parties.34
The issue first came to a head in the case Criminal proceedings against A in
2007, but the EFTA Court had already five years earlier in an obiter dictum in
Karlsson expressed clearly that it followed from the Agreement’s article 7 and
Protocol 35 that the principle of direct effect was not part of the EEA
Agreement.35 In Criminal proceedings against A, the EFTA Court could
simply have made a brief reference to the opinion in Karlsson, and added that
EEA law consequently does not require non-implemented EEA rules to take
precedence over national rules. It is therefore remarkable that the EFTA Court
found it appropriate to emphasise not only the homogeneity objective, the
EFTA States’ implementation obligations under article 7 EEA and the duty
to give primacy to implemented EEA rules pursuant to Protocol 35, but also
the duty of EEA-consistent interpretation of national law, the EFTA States’
liability for violations of EEA law and the power of the EFTA Surveillance
Authority (ESA) under article 31 SCA to bring a case concerning a violation
of EEA law before the EFTA Court.36 One is left with the impression that the
EFTA Court’s reasoning was addressed just as much to the EU (ie the ECJ) as
to the Liechtenstein court that had submitted the case. With the exception of
the duty of EEA-consistent interpretation of national law, the latter was not
the appropriate addressee for the obligations and remedies listed. The message
31 C Baudenbacher ‘Institutionen, Entscheidungsprozesse und allgemeine Rechtsprinzipien im
EWR-Abkommen’ in C Baudenbacher (ed) Internationales und Europäisches Wirtschaftsrecht
(Norderstedt, St. Gallen 2004) 207, 219.
32 Case E-1/07 Criminal proceedings against A [2007] EFTA Ct Rep 245, para 39.
33 See only the cases 14/83 von Colson [1984] ECR 1891, para 26 and C-106/89 Marleasing
[1990] ECR I-4135, para 8.
34 See eg, Baudenbacher (n 31) 219; Norberg (n 12) 374; Sevón and Johansson (n 12) 385;
Sevón (n 13) 731.
35 Karlsson (n 28) para 28. Arguably, the EFTA Court suggested this position already in
Sveinbjörnsdóttir (n 23), para 63.
36 Criminal proceedings against A (n 32) para 37–42.
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from the EFTA Court seems to be that the EU need not worry about the
absence of direct effect and primacy in the EFTA pillar since EEA law con-
tains a number of other mechanisms intended to guarantee a homogeneous
EEA and an overall balance between the obligations of the Contracting
Parties.
B. Minimizing the Importance of Differences in Context and Purpose
In addition to ensuring that EEA law becomes effective in the EFTA States’
national laws, the EFTA Court must have been anxious to prove wrong the
ECJ’s forecast that differences in context and purpose would inevitably
undermine the objective of an interpretation of EEA rules in conformity with
identically worded provisions of EU law. Were it to become widely perceived
in the EU that the EFTA Court—with reference to the EEA Agreement’s
more limited scope and less comprehensive objectives—was more sympath-
etic towards attempts by the EFTA States to defend their political latitude
than would be the case in the ECJ, the condition of reciprocity between the
Contracting Parties’ obligations could be expected to come under fire. At
worst, the EFTA Court could be perceived by the ECJ as a contributor to the
feared ‘cherry-picking’ of the EFTA States rather than as an independent court
of justice.
As early as in the Restamark case, the Finnish government argued that the
absence of harmonisation of taxation rules in the EEA could justify the
existence of a State import monopoly for alcoholic beverages, even though
such a monopoly might be incompatible with Community law.37 This attempt
to legitimize the import monopoly as a system for levying taxes seemed rather
contrived. The argument was not even mentioned by the EFTA Court, which
asserted instead that the EEA Agreement’s provisions concerning quantitative
restrictions on imports and commercial monopolies in articles 11, 13 and 16
must be interpreted in accordance with the identically worded provisions in
articles 28, 30 and 31 EC (now 34, 36 and 37 TFEU).38
What is more surprising is that the EFTA Court itself, in the Maglite case
from 1997, introduced into its interpretation of article 7(1) of the Trademark
Directive (89/104/EEC) the argument that the EEA Agreement—unlike the
then EC Treaty—does not establish a customs union with a common com-
mercial policy in relation to third countries.39 In the Silhouette case the
following year, it became evident that the ECJ did not share the EFTA Court’s
understanding that the Directive allows for international exhaustion of trade-
mark rights.40 The EFTA Court made a U-turn when the issue was raised
37 Restamark (n 17), Report for the Hearing, para 59.
38 Restamark (n 17) paras 46, 52, 64 and 80.
39 Case E-2/97 Maglite [1997] EFTA Ct Rep 129, paras 25 ff.
40 Case C-355/96 Silhouette [1998] ECR I-4799.
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again in the L’Oréal case of 2008. The Court pointed out that the homogeneity
principle entails a presumption that provisions worded in the same manner
in the EEA Agreement as in Community law shall be interpreted in the
same manner, even though differences in scope and purpose may in ‘specific
circumstances’ lead to differences in interpretation.41 The governments of all
of the three EFTA States as well as the ESA argued that the absence of a
common commercial policy justified the Maglite solution, but the EFTA
Court concluded that the differences between the EEA Agreement and the
(then) EC Treaty with respect to commercial relationships with third countries
did not constitute ‘compelling reasons’ for divergent interpretations of the
Trademark Directive in EEA law and Community law.42 Read in context,
L’Oréal leaves one with the impression that the EFTA Court not only departed
from the concrete solution in Maglite, but also raised the threshold for
allowing differences in purpose and context to justify derogation from the
homogeneity principle.43 It must be said, however, that the EFTA Court was
in a difficult position; in Silhouette the ECJ had not only interpreted the
Trademark Directive differently from the EFTA Court, but also assumed that
its interpretation was valid in the context of EEA law.44 In a case where the
ECJ had disregarded the specific EEA arguments put forward by the EFTA
Court inMaglite, it would not look too good if the EFTA Court were to adhere
to a divergent interpretation that gave the EFTA States greater political lati-
tude than the EU States.45
The minimising by the EFTA Court of the importance of differences in
context and purpose had, however, started well before L’Oréal. In the
Rainford-Towning case from 1998, Liechtenstein’s government had argued—
referring to Maglite and ECJ Opinion 1/91—that ‘the lesser ambitions of the
EEA’ indicated that the elimination of restrictions on the freedom of estab-
lishment in relation to article 31 must be perceived as less absolute than the
ECJ’s interpretation of the corresponding provision in article 43 EC (now 49
TFEU).46 The EFTA Court was not convinced.
Correspondingly, in case E-6/98 Norway v ESA, the Norwegian government
argued in vain that a system of differentiated social security contributions paid
by employers did not constitute State aid since the EEA Agreement does not
aim at harmonisation of taxation.47 As the ECJ had previously held that the
tax-law character of an aid system is no obstacle to regarding it as State aid
in relation to article 87 EC (now 107 TFEU), the Norwegian government in
41 L’Oréal (n 6) para 27. The presumption originates from case E-3/98 Rainford-Towning
[1998] EFTA Ct Rep 205.
42 L’Oreal (n 6) paras 37, cf 23.
43 See T van Stiphout ‘The L’Oréal Cases—Some Thoughts in the Role of the EFTA Court in
the EEA Legal Framework: Because it is worth it!’ (2009) Jus & News 7–18.
44 Silhouette (n 40) paras 30–31.
45 For a different assessment, see van Stiphout (n 43) 11–15.
46 Rainford-Towning (n 41), para 21, cf. Report for the Hearing, paras 31–32.
47 Case E-6/98 Norway v ESA [1999] EFTA Ct Rep 74, paras 34, cf 26.
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fact argued that the identically worded provision in article 61 EEA should be
interpreted differently as a consequence of the differences in the context of the
provisions. The absence of taxation harmonisation as a justification for inter-
preting EEA law provisions differently from identically worded provisions in
Community law was also argued by the Icelandic government in Einarsson48
and again by the Norwegian government in Fokus Bank49—the EFTA Court
was not convinced in either case. The fact that tax law as such is not covered
by the EEA Agreement does not prevent the Agreement’s basic rules on State
aid and free movement of goods, persons, services and capital placing the
same restrictions on the EFTA States’ taxation competence as identically
worded provisions in EU law.
Another difference between EEA law and EU law relates to the EFTA
States’ insistence that the Agreement should not impinge on the independence
of the national courts. In the Piazza case in 2005, the Liechtenstein govern-
ment argued that in consideration of the independence of the national courts,
EEA law could not impact on the EFTA States’ procedural legislation in the
same way as Community law.50 However, the EFTA Court made no mention
of this argument when it established that article 40 EEA concerning the free
movement of capital must be interpreted in conformity with article 56 EC
(now 63 TFEU), with the consequence that EEA law prohibits procedural
legislation that accepts the provision of security for procedural costs from
national sources only.51
Thus, it was no surprise when the EFTA Court in case E-2/06 ESA
v Norway, concerning the conditions for concession for acquisition of hydro-
power resources, rejected the arguments of the Norwegian and Icelandic
governments claiming that article 125 EEA ought to be interpreted more
narrowly than the identically worded provision in article 295 EC (now 345
TFEU) ‘due to fundamental differences between the EC Treaty and the EEA
Agreement’.52 The Norwegian government supported this argument with
reference to the ECJ Opinion 1/91.53 The EFTA Court reiterated the wording
from the above-mentioned Rainford-Towning case that only in ‘specific
circumstances’ may differences in scope and purpose lead to divergent
interpretation. In the Court’s opinion there were no such circumstances in this
case. Article 125 EEA was therefore to be interpreted in conformity with
article 295 EC (now 345 TFEU), with the consequence that national rules on
48 Einarsson (n 20), Report for the Hearing, para 68.
49 Case E-1/04 Fokus Bank [2004] EFTA Ct Rep 11, Report for the Hearing, para 34.
50 Case E-10/04 Piazza [2005] EFTA Ct. Rep. 76, Report for the Hearing, para 35.
51 Piazza (n 50) paras 33 ff.
52 Case E-2/06 ESA v Norway [2007] EFTA Ct Rep 164, paras 61, cf 58.
53 ibid, Report for the Hearing, para 49.
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property ownership are not excluded per se from the scope of the EEA
Agreement.54
Since the ‘compelling reasons’ test in the L’Oréal case, the threshold for
divergent interpretations seems to have been set even higher. Thus, we can
safely assume that it will be very difficult for the EFTA States to advance
differences in context and purpose between EEA law and EU law in order to
secure greater political leeway than the ECJ allows the EU Member States.
C. Rejection of the EFTA States’ Preconditions when Signing the
EEA Agreement
In addition to arguments relating to differences in purpose and context, the
EFTA States have on several occasions referred to their preconditions when
signing the EEA Agreement (or in subsequent decisions in the EEA Joint
Committee) to argue in favour of interpreting EEA provisions differently from
the ECJ’s interpretation of identically worded provisions of EU law. In view
of the limits of the homogeneity objective defined in L’Oreál, the question is
whether the preconditions of the contracting parties in a concrete case con-
stitute ‘compelling reasons’ for an interpretation of EEA law that derogates
from EU law. The EFTA Court has never accepted such objections. When
analysing the case-law, there is nevertheless reason to distinguish between
unilateral preconditions and preconditions claimed to be common to all
Contracting Parties. Further, a distinction also has to be drawn between pre-
conditions relating to the interpretation of substantive EEA law and those
relating to the effect of EEA law in national law.
It is obvious that no significant importance can be attached to preconditions
that cannot even be claimed to have been common to all contracting parties at
the date of signature. Already in the Restamark case, the Finnish government
tried unsuccessfully to save its import monopoly for alcoholic beverages by
referring to a joint declaration that the Nordic EFTA States had tied to the
EEA Agreement, justifying Nordic monopoly systems on important grounds
of health and social policy.55 The EFTA Court judgment in the aforemen-
tioned case on acquisition of hydropower resources from 2007 is also illus-
trative of this point. This judgment dismissed objections from the Icelandic
government that for both Norway and Iceland it was ‘a pre-condition for the
Agreement [. . .] that ownership over energy resources would remain unaf-
fected’, stating that ‘[u]nilateral expressions of understanding of the kind
claimed to have been made by Norway and Iceland’ could not justify an
54 ESA v Norway (n 52) paras 61 ff, cf 59. In particular, the EFTA Court held that Icelandic and
Norwegian preconditions as to the interpretation of art 125 EEA constituted no such specific
circumstances, cf further s IV.C.
55 Restamark (n 6) Report for the Hearing, para 58.
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interpretation of Article 125 EEA that diverged from the ECJ’s interpretation
of article 295 EC (now 345 TFEU).56
The evaluation is more difficult in cases where common preconditions that
would lead to a divergent interpretation of EEA law are claimed to be present.
If we—as the ECJ did in Opinion 1/91—base ourselves on general rules of
international law relating to the interpretation of treaties, it is undisputed that
treaty provisions should be interpreted in accordance with the common in-
tentions of the Contracting Parties. When interpreting the substantive content
of the EEA rules, however, acceptance of such arguments would conflict with
the overriding objective of a homogeneous EEA per se.
The judgment in the ESA v Liechtenstein case of 2007 is illustrative of the
EFTA Court’s attitude to this issue. The Liechtenstein government argued
in this case that it was ‘a condition sine qua non when acceding to the EEA’
that a specific form of allowance for persons in need of care was not covered
by Regulation 1408/71 relating to the application of social security schemes
to employed persons, to self-employed persons and to members of their fam-
ilies moving within the EU, and that it could not therefore be claimed by
EEA citizens who are not resident in Liechtenstein.57 In connection with
Liechtenstein’s accession to the EEA Agreement, the allowance in question
was listed in a special Annex to the Regulation, which was a precondition for
excluding it. However, subsequent ECJ case-law made it clear that such listing
is not in itself sufficient to exclude a benefit if it did not also meet
the Regulation’s own conditions for such exclusion (which the Liechtenstein
allowance failed to do).58 Liechtenstein objected that the inclusion of the
allowance in the Annex was the result of an EEA Joint Committee decision
and therefore subject to ‘the rules of public international law’, implying that it
was ‘binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good
faith’.59 This international law approach, however, gained no backing from
the EFTA Court, however, which stated that ‘in its interpretation of the EEA
Agreement, the Court cannot be bound by mere expectations of the
Contracting Parties as to the exact content of the obligations the Parties enter
into.’60
Even if we accept that specific preconditions of the Contracting Parties
must give way to the overriding intention of a homogeneous EEA when
interpreting the substantive content of the EEA rules, it is not given that
this applies mutatis mutandis to the legal effect of the EEA rules in national
law. In Sveinbjörnsdóttir, Iceland, Norway, Sweden and—interestingly—the
Commission all rejected the existence of State liability, referring explicitly to
56 ESA v Norway (n 51) para 59, cf 49.
57 Case E-5/06 ESA v Liechtenstein [2007] EFTA Ct Rep 296, para 47.
58 cf the references to ECJ case-law in para 61.
59 ibid para 47. cf further Report for the Hearing, para 70, where reference is made to art 26 of
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and the principle of pacta sunt servanda.
60 ESA v Liechtenstein (n 57) para 63.
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the common intentions when negotiating the Agreement.61 The EFTA Court,
however, made no mention of this objection. The Norwegian government
reiterated the argument in Karlsson,62 but once more the EFTA Court failed to
comment. Of course, the outcome of the cases reveals that the Court did not
attach much importance to the intentions of the Contracting Parties, but a
justification of this would definitely have been appropriate. In the absence of
such justification, we can but note that the EFTA Court seems to share its
President’s opinion that the initial intentions of the Contracting Parties to the
EEA Agreement has ‘no relevance’ to the development of EEA law, at least
not to the interpretation of the main part of the Agreement.63
D. Rejection of all Attempts by the EFTA States to Increase their
Political Latitude
It seems that the EFTA Court has deemed it important not to appear more
sympathetic than the ECJ towards attempts by the EFTA States to increase
their political latitude also in cases in which arguments for strict interpretation
of EEA law are not linked to EEA-specific circumstances and can thus be
claimed to apply to interpretation of the underlying EU law as well.
An example of this can be seen in the‘Postdoc’ case from 2003, in which
the Norwegian government requested the EFTA Court to derogate from
the ECJ’s interpretation of the Employment Equality Directive (76/207/EEC),
so that affirmative action would no longer be regarded as discrimination
in the sense of the Directive, but rather as ‘an intrinsic dimension of the very
prohibition thereof’.64 This would have made it possible to earmark certain
university posts for women, thereby increasing the political latitude of the
EFTA States. However, the EFTA Court dismissed the request, referring to
the homogeneity principle.65
The EFTA Court has been similarly dismissive of attempts to extend
the range of legitimate considerations that can be used to justify restrictions to
the four freedoms.66 For example, in Einarsson the Icelandic and Norwegian
governments argued unsuccessfully that the preservation of the Icelandic
language as a central component of Iceland’s cultural heritage and national
identity should be allowed to justify derogation from the prohibition against
discriminatory taxation in article 14 EEA.67
Two cases deserving of particular attention in this connection are Nille from
1997 and Fokus Bank from 2004. In Nille, the Norwegian government argued
61 Sveinbjörnsdóttir (n 23), Report for the Hearing, para 52 ff.
62 Karlsson (n 28), Report for the Hearing, para 57.
63 C Baudenbacher ‘Zur Auslegung des EWR-Rechts durch den EFTA-Gerichtshof ’ in
G Müller et al (eds), Festschrift für Günter Hirsch (CH Beck, Munich, 2008) 27, 49.
64 Case E-1/02 ESA v Norway (‘Postdoc’) [2003] EFTA Ct Rep 1, para 25.
65 ibid para 45. 66 See in detail Baudenbacher (n 63) 29.
67 Einarsson (n 20), paras 40 ff.
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that the possible discriminatory effect of Norwegian provisions on the rental
of video cassettes could be justified by reference to the rules’ cultural policy
objectives.68 The EFTA Court dismissed this on the grounds that cultural
policy is not listed among the legitimate considerations in article 13 EEA, and
that the ECJ had consistently held that the corresponding provision in article
36 EC (now 42 TFEU) must be interpreted strictly, as it constitutes a dero-
gation from the basic rule that all obstacles to the free movement of goods
between the Member States must be eliminated.69 Shortly afterwards, how-
ever, the ECJ made it clear in de Agostini that the right to supplement the then
EC Treaty with ‘overriding requirements of general public importance’is
precluded only in cases of direct discrimination.70
A similar discrepancy between EFTA Court and ECJ case-law came to light
in Fokus Bank. The Norwegian government requested that the EFTA Court
accept a justification of the restriction on the free movement of capital in the
EEA on the grounds of cohesion of the international tax system, which would
mean that the effect of international tax treaties must be included when de-
termining the presence or absence of discrimination between resident and non-
resident shareholders.71 The EFTA Court rejected this on the grounds that an
EEA Member State cannot make the rights pursuant to article 40 EEA con-
tingent on the content of a bilateral agreement entered into with another EEA
Member State—such a solution would give bilateral tax agreements pre-
cedence over EEA law.72 In the subsequent ACT Group Litigation and
Denkavit cases, however, the ECJ arrived at the opposite conclusion.73 In his
opinion in ACT Group Litigation, AG Geelhoed took a clear stand against the
EFTA Court’s solution in Fokus Bank, and pointed out that ‘[i]f the effect of
the DTC [double taxation convention] in an individual case were not taken
into account, this would ignore the economic reality of that taxable subject’s
activity and incentives in a cross-border context’.74
With hindsight, it is easy to say that the EFTA Court in Nille and Fokus
Bank failed to predict subsequent development in ECJ case-law. However,
in light of the homogeneity objective and the requirement for reciprocity
between the Contracting Parties’ obligations it is hardly surprising that the
EFTA Court is reluctant to forestall a development in ECJ case-law that would
give the Member States greater political leeway. Nonetheless, this begs the
question whether the EFTA Court is as cautious when the opposite is the case,
68 Case E-5/96 Nille [1997] EFTA Ct Rep 30, para 18.
69 ibid paras 30–34.
70 Joined cases C-34-36/95 de Agostini [1997] ECR I-3843, paras 46, cf 42.
71 Fokus Bank (n 49) para 31. 72 ibid para 31.
73 Cases C-374/04 ACT Group Litigation [2006] I-11673 and C-170/05 Denkavit [2006]
I-11949.
74 Opinion in ACT Group Litigation, para 71, cf fn 83, and Denkavit, paras 36 ff, cf fn 28. The
EFTA Court has later fallen into line, see case E-7/07 Seabrokers [2008] EFTA Ct Rep 171, paras
48–49.
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ie when it is a matter of developing EEA law in a more integration-friendly
direction.
E. Integration-friendly Interpretation in‘Hard Cases’
In cases in which there are no EEA-specific circumstances to justify a diver-
gent interpretation, it is fairly clear that the homogeneity objective pre-
supposes an interpretation of EEA law in conformity with the underlying EU
law. However, where the interpretation of EU law is unclear, the objective of
homogeneous interpretation as such provides little guidance.
In particular, the Kellogg’s case from 2001 shows that the EFTA Court does
not shy away from developing EEA law in an integration-friendly direction.
At issue in this case was whether a prohibition on the import of cornflakes
fortified with vitamins and minerals was in accordance with the provisions of
article 11 EEA. The Norwegian government pointed out that the ECJ in
Sandoz had stated that the Member States were only obliged to allow imports
of foodstuffs fortified with vitamins if the additives filled a ‘real nutritional
need’.75 In Kellogg’s, however, the EFTA Court did not accept that the mere
absence of a nutritional need in the population was sufficient to justify an
import ban.76 On the contrary, the authorities were required to conduct a
specific assessment of whether the vitamin and iron-enriched cornflakes
would present any danger to public health. In this case, the EFTA Court’s
approach entailed a clear restriction of the EEA States’ right to justify import
restrictions by reference to the precautionary principle, inter alia in the form of
a requirement for a comprehensive assessment of the risk to public health
based on the most recent scientific information.77 Shortly afterwards, in a
similar case against Denmark, the Commission referred to the EFTA Court
judgment and described it as an expression of a legal development that meant
that the ECJ’s previous approach in the Sandoz judgment should be deemed to
have been abandoned. The Danish government replied that the EFTA Court’s
judgment was inconsistent with existing ECJ case-law. Referring explicitly to
Kellogg’s, the ECJ decided to follow the EFTA Court.78
Further, two interesting examples in private-law disputes are provided by
the LO case of 2002 and the Paranova case of 2003. A central issue in LO was
whether collective agreements between employers’ and employees’ associ-
ations are included in the prohibition of cartels in article 53 EEA. Referring
to the ECJ’s Albany judgment from 1999,79 the Icelandic, Norwegian and
Swedish governments argued that collective agreement provisions aimed at
improving working and employment conditions for the employees must, by
75 Case 174/82 Sandoz [1983] 2445, para 19.
76 Case E-3/00 ESA v Norway (‘Kellogg’s’) [2000–2001] EFTA Ct Rep 73, para 28.
77 ibid para 30.
78 Case C-192/01 Commission v Denmark [2003] ECR I-9693.
79 Case C-67/96 Albany [1999] ECR I-5751.
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virtue of their nature and purpose, fall outside the scope of article 81 EC
(now 101 TFEU), and this should applymutatis mutandis for article 53 EEA.80
The Commission and the ESA also argued in favour of a limited judicial
review of the collective agreement. The EFTA Court, however, pointed out
that the immunity of collective agreements from rules of competition cannot
be given unlimited application.81 In this connection, the Court referred to AG
Jacobs’ opinion in Albany, in which he argued that collective agreements
cannot deprive the prohibition on cartels of all its meaning.82 The reference is
interesting because the ECJ did not refer to the Advocate General in this case.
The EFTA Court subsequently arrived at the conclusion that even though it is
to be presumed that disputed provisions in the collective agreement fell out-
side the scope of article 53 EEA, the national court would nevertheless have
to investigate how the agreement was being practised, whether the parties
actually pursued the stated socio-political objectives, and also what effects the
agreement had.83 According to Baudenbacher, one of the judges in the case,
the Court thus demonstrated a more competition-friendly attitude than the
ECJ.84
The EFTA Court’s competition-friendly attitude also manifested itself in
Paranova, a case which dealt with the issue of trademark rights in the parallel
import of pharmaceutical products. In Bristol-Myers Squibb, the ECJ had
found that a parallel importer may only repackage and reaffix the producer’s
trademark where it is necessary in order to market the product in the Member
State of import.85 The issue in Paranova was whether the necessity test should
also be applied to the parallel importer’s packaging design in a case of lawful
repackaging. The EFTA Court rejected this with reference to the fundamental
principle of free movement of goods. After having lawfully repackaged the
products, and reaffixed the proprietor’s trademark, the parallel importer is to
be considered an operator on essentially equal footing with the manufacturer
and the proprietor.86 According to article 7(2) of the Trademark Directive, a
‘legitimate reason’ to oppose further commercialisation of repackaged phar-
maceutical products only exists if the packaging design is liable to harm the
trademark or the proprietor’s reputation. According to Baudenbacher, one of
the judges in the case, this judgment illustrated a fundamentally sympathetic
attitude towards the free movement of goods in the EFTA Court.87 Paranova
led to the English Court of Appeal in Boehringer Ingelheim II asking
the ECJ whether the EFTA Court’s understanding of the Directive was
80 Report for the Hearing in case E-8/00 LO [2002] EFTA Ct Rep 114, paras 209 ff, 212 ff and
218 ff. respectively. 81 LO (n 80) para 35.
82 Opinion in Albany (n 79) paras 186 ff.
83 LO (n 80) paras 52 ff, cf paras 72 ff. The position of the EFTA Court was explicitly endorsed
by AG Maduro in case C-438/05 Viking Line [2007] ECR I-10779, para 27.
84 Baudenbacher (n 62) 32.
85 Joined cases C-427/93, C-429/93 and C-436/93 Bristol-Myers Squibb [1996] ECR I-3457.
86 Case E-3/02 Paranova [2003] EFTA Ct Rep 101, para 45.
87 Baudenbacher (n 63) 38.
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correct.88 It was argued before the ECJ that the EFTA Court had attached
insufficient importance to the trademark proprietor’s right to present the
trademark in the manner he wishes.89 The ECJ, however, concurred with the
understanding of the EFTA Court.90
Further examples of the EFTA Court’s integration-friendly approach
to EEA law are provided by cases such as Mattel/Lego, Finanger, Norwegian
Bankers’ Association, E-1/05 ESA v Norway (‘life-insurance’) and Lad-
brokes.91 The EFTA Court’s dynamic interpretation in Finanger won sub-
sequent approval from the ECJ in Candolin,92 whereas the offensives in
Mattel/Lego, Norwegian Bankers’ Association and Ladbrokes failed to con-
vince the ECJ in the subesquent cases de Agostini, Ferring and Liga Portu-
guesa.93
To sum up, the overall impression left by the EFTA Court case-law of the
past 15 years is that in ‘hard cases’, the Court does not shy away from taking a
leading role in the dynamic development of EEA law. As has been shown, the
EFTA Court has in several cases won subsequent approbation of the ECJ,
while in other cases it has had to (or will have to) correct its own course after
the ECJ delivered its opinion. In the present context, the point is that the
EFTA Court’s decisions follow a fairly clear-cut pattern. Arguably,Maglite is
the only ‘hard case’ in which the EFTA Court preferred a solution giving the
EFTA States greater political leeway. It must nevertheless be added that, from
the global perspective, an opening for national rules on international exhaus-
tion of trademark rights was the most free-trade-friendly and competition-
friendly solution.94 Besides, as has been shown, Maglite was later overruled
by L’Oréal.
F. In Search of a Good Relationship with the ECJ
A final aspect of EFTA Court case-law of interest in the present context is the
clear disinclination to engage in any open confrontation with the ECJ. It is
illustrative of this that the EFTA Court has never quarrelled openly with the
ECJ’s characterization of the EEA Agreement in Opinion 1/91, despite the
88 Case C-348/04 Boehringer Ingelheim II [2007] ECR I-3391.
89 See the submissions referred by GA Sharpston in her opinion, para 53.
90 Boehringer Ingelheim II (n 88) para 38.
91 Joined cases E-8/94 and E-9/94 Mattel/Lego [1994–1995] EFTA Ct Rep 115; E-1/99
Finanger [1999] EFTA Ct Rep 119; E-4/97 Norwegian Bankers’ Association [1999] EFTA
Ct Rep 1; E-1/05 ESA v Norway [2005] EFTA Ct Rep 234 and E-3/06 Ladbrokes [2007] EFTA
Ct Rep 86. Space does not allow further elaboration of these cases. As far as Finanger, E-1/05
ESA v Norway and Ladbrokes is concerned, suffice to note that the president of the EFTA Court,
who himself participated in these cases, heralds them as examples of dynamic interpretation,
see Baudenbacher (n 63) 33, 42.
92 Case C-537/03 Candolin [2005] ECR I-5745.
93 de Agostini (n 70); C-53/00 Ferring [2001] ECR I-9067; C-42/07 Liga Portuguesa,
judgment 8.9.2008 (nyr).
94 Something which the EFTA Court itself noted, cf Maglite (n 39) para 19.
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fact that it has been evident ever since Restamark that the EFTA Court does
not share the ECJ’s perception that the EEA Agreement’s purpose and context
constitute an obstacle to the realization of a homogeneous EEA. The Court’s
silence on this matter is particularly evident in Sveinbjörnsdóttir, where the
Icelandic, Norwegian and Swedish governments had all dismissed the exist-
ence of State liability for breach of the EEA Agreement, with explicit refer-
ence to the ECJ’s characterization of the Agreement as an international law
agreement that ‘only creates rights and obligations between the Contracting
Parties’, unlike Community law ‘the subjects of which comprise not only
Member States but also their nationals’.95 The EFTA Court’s attempt to avoid
open confrontation with the ECJ on this point is probably not surprising; it is
nevertheless clear that the recognition of private individuals as legal persons
under the EEA Agreement constitutes a sine qua non condition for the exist-
ence of State liability.96 Rather than ignoring the ECJ’s opinion, the EFTA
Court ought to have pointed out in Sveinbjörnsdóttir that Opinion 1/91 was
given on the basis of an earlier draft of the EEA Agreement that did not
include the relatively unambiguous wording of the eighth paragraph of the
preamble on ‘the important role that individuals will play in the European
Economic Area through the exercise of the rights conferred on them by the
Agreement and through the judicial defence of these rights’.97 In this way, the
Court could have managed quite easily to steal a march on its critics.
This striving of the EFTA Court towards a good relationship with the ECJ
is also reflected in what can be described as a fairly active quest for support
in ECJ case-law. A good example is the use of the ECJ’s reference to
Sveinbjörnsdóttir in the Rechberger case. When the issue of EEA liability re-
emerged in the Karlsson case, the EFTA Court took the opportunity to point to
this reference in a manner that indicated that the ECJ agreed with the EFTA
Court’s understanding of State liability as an integral part of the EEA
Agreement.98 As we will see below, opinion is divided on whether the ECJ’s
reference to Sveinbjörnsdóttir can really be interpreted in this way. For our
present purposes, the point is that in Karlsson the EFTA Court obviously
wanted to take the ECJ ‘onboard as an ally’.99
V. THE TRANSFORMATION: A FRIENDLIER ECJ
In the years immediately following the entry into force of the EEA Agree-
ment, the ECJ’s attitude seemed rooted in the scepticism it had manifested in
95 Opinion 1/91 (n 5) paras 20–21.
96 T Bruha ‘Is the EEA an Internal Market?’ in P-C Müller-Graff and E Selvig (eds), EEA-EU
Relations (Berlin Verlag, Berlin, 1999) 97, 123.
97 An account of the preamble of the original draft agreement is to be found in the ECJ’s
Opinion 1/91 (n 5).
98 Karlsson (n 27), para 25, with reference to case C-140/97 Rechberger [1999] ECR I-3499,
para 39. 99 Baudenbacher (n 12) 49.
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Opinion 1/91. An early example of this can be seen in AG Fennelly’s opinion
from 1996 in Yamanouchi Pharmaceutical, in which the plaintiff argued that
certain specific changes in the EEA version of a Regulation on protection
certificates for medicinal products shed light on the interpretation of the
original EC version of the Regulation. This argumentation was somewhat
contrived—it was evident that the sole purpose of the changes in the EEA
version of the Regulation was to assimilate the EFTA States into the existing
certificate system. However, the Advocate General found it appropriate not
only to dismiss the argument, but also to add—with reference to ECJ Opinion
1/91—that an interpretation of Community law in the light of EEA law was
always problematic because ‘the differences in character between the EEC/EC
Treaty and the EEA Agreement are notorious.’100
Also with respect to its relationship with the EFTA Court, the attitude of the
ECJ in the years immediately after the entry into force of the EEA Agreement
seemed marked by the reluctance manifested in Opinion 1/91 to allow other
courts to influence the development of Community law. It is illustrative that
the ECJ in Franzén deliberated the Swedish import and retail monopoly
for alcoholic beverages with absolutely no mention of the EFTA Court’s
judgment in Restamark.101 Similarly in Silhouette, the ECJ elected to tacitly
ignore the EFTA Court’s interpretation of the Trademark Directive inMaglite,
despite the fact that AG Jacobs had referred to the case in his opinion.102 Thus,
Süzen and de Agostini, both from 1997, represented an important break in that
they were the first cases in which the ECJ, through its references to Ulstein
and Røiseng and to Lego/Mattel respectively, referred to EFTA Court case-
law.103
The matter of the EEA Agreement’s position in Community law came to a
head before the Court of First Instance (CFI) in the Opel Austria case in
1997.104 With the support of the Austrian government, Opel Austria brought
an action against the Council for the annulment of a regulation that introduced
a customs duty on a specific type of gearbox manufactured by a factory in
Austria. A central question in this case was whether the regulation was an
infringement of article 10 EEA. With reference to ECJ Opinion 1/91, the
Council, with the support of the Commission, argued that the differences
between the EEA Agreement and the then EC Treaty indicated that article 10
EEA could not be interpreted in conformity with the identically worded
prohibition on customs duties in the EC Treaty.105 However, in a decision
whose importance to EEA law cannot be overestimated, the CFI stated that
from the date of its entry into force the EEA Agreement constituted an integral
100 Opinion in case C-110/95 Yamanouchi Pharmaceutical [1997] ECR I-3251, paras 30–32.
101 Case C-189/95 Franzén [1997] I-5909.
102 Opinion in Silhouette (n 40) paras 43–44.
103 Cases C-13/95 Süzen [1997] ECR I-1259, para 10 and de Agostini (n 70) para 37.
104 Case T-115/94 Opel Austria [1997] ECR II-39.
105 ibid para 62 ff.
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part of Community law and that the prohibition in article 10 was so uncon-
ditional and precise that it had direct effect.106 With reference to article 6
EEA, article 10 was interpreted in conformity with ECJ case-law prior to the
date of signature. Further, the CFI held that the EEA Agreement ‘involves a
high degree of integration, with objectives that exceed those of a mere free-
trade agreement’ and explicitly rejected that ECJ Opinion 1/91 was an argu-
ment against uniform interpretation of the EEA Agreement and Community
law.107 In recognition of the EFTA Court, its judgments in Restamark and
Scottish Salmon Growers Association were used to argue that the obligation
to consider subsequent ECJ case-law in relation to Article 3(2) SCA would
help to attain the homogeneity objective also in the future.108 The Council
appeared convinced by the argumentation—at least to the extent that it did not
appeal the judgment to the ECJ.
The absence of an appeal in Opel Austria meant that the ECJ’s position on
the EEA Agreement had still not been clarified by the time of the Andersson
and the Rechberger cases, in which the Court was asked, respectively, about
Swedish and Austrian State liability for breaches of the EEA Agreement in the
period in which they were still members of EFTA. In both instances the ECJ
declined to answer, stating that it had no jurisdiction to pronounce on the
effect of the EEA Agreement in Sweden and Austria prior to their accession
to the EU.109 In Andersson, however, AG Cosmas took up the alternative
question of whether the EEA Agreement embraces a principle of State liability
for breach of the Agreement. His opinion was submitted on 19 January 1999,
just over a month after the EFTA Court had declared the existence of such
a principle in Sveinbjörnsdóttir. However, the Advocate General did not
mention the EFTA Court’s judgment when, with reference to ECJ Opinion
1/91, he rejected the argument that the Community law principle of liability
for Member States for breach of Community law could be regarded part of
EEA law.110 According to the Advocate General, it followed implicitly from
the ECJ Opinion that the principles of primacy and direct effect of Community
law did not apply to EEA law, which meant that State liability, which he
described as ‘inextricably linked to the fundamental principles set out above’,
could not be transposed to the EEA either.
When judgment was handed down in Andersson, the ECJ did not mention
the Advocate General’s views on the liability issue. However, in its judgment
in Rechberger of the very same day, the ECJ referred in an obiter dictum to the
EFTA Court’s position in Sveinbjörnsdottir.111 The ECJ did not explicitly
state its own view on the liability issue. It would, however, be rather odd if the
ECJ were to have made the Austrian court explicitly aware of the EFTA
106 ibid para 102. 107 ibid paras 107 and 109, respectively.
108 ibid para 108 i.f.
109 Cases C-321/97 Andersson [1999] ECR I-3551, paras 28–31; Rechberger (n 98) para 38.
110 Opinion in Andersson (n 109), paras 37–54.
111 Rechberger (n 98) para 39.
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Court’s position on the issue if it disagreed with it. The absence of a corre-
sponding reference in Andersson makes it obvious that the inclusion of the
reference in Rechberger had been carefully thought through. Both cases were
decided in plenary session, but with somewhat differing compositions.112
However, seven of the judges participated in both judgments and the
Rechberger judgment refers explicitly to the decision on the jurisdiction issue
in Andersson. The judges must, therefore, have been well aware of the dif-
ference between the judgments regarding the reference to the EFTA Court—a
difference that can only be explained by the different composition of the
Court in the two cases. The predominant opinion in the literature is therefore
that the reference in Rechberger has to be interpreted as an implicit recog-
nition of the EFTA Court’s position.113 Viewed in conjunction with the
silence in Andersson (and AG Cosmas’ dismissive attitude), it seems evident
that at this point there was some internal disagreement in the ECJ regarding
the interpretation of the EEA Agreement.
In the wake of Rechberger there were several judgments in which the ECJ
referred to EFTA Court case-law to support its arguments concerning
interpretation of Community law. In the Oy Liikenne case from 2001, the ECJ
concurred with the EFTA Court in Eidesund and Ask that the fact that
an undertaking is transferred as a consequence of a public tender procedure
does not in itself exclude the transfer from the scope of the Transfer of
Undertakings Directive (77/187/EEC).114 In Monsanto Agricoltura and the
aforementioned case C-192/01, Commission v Denmark, both from 2003, the
ECJ agreed with the EFTA Court’s interpretation of the precautionary prin-
ciple in Kellogg’s.115
There was, however, no final clarification of the position of the EEA
Agreement in Community law until the Ospelt case in 2003. A key question in
this case was whether Austria could justify restrictions on the free movement
of capital in the EEA on the grounds that the EFTA State Liechtenstein was a
‘third country’ under article 57 EC (now 64 TFEU). The ECJ pointed out,
however, that the legal basis for considering the movement of capital between
an EU Member State and an EFTA State is article 40 EEA, and Annex XII to
the Agreement. With reference to the fact that ‘[o]ne of the principal aims of
the EEA Agreement is to provide for the fullest possible realisation of the free
movement of goods, persons, service and capital within the European
Economic Area, so that the internal market established within the European
112 Andersson was decided by what at the time was called the big plenum, which consisted of
eleven judges, whereas Rechberger was heard by the small plenum consisting of nine judges.
113 See eg, the Editorial comments of the CMLR (n 25) 700, Baudenbacher (n 31) 216 and
Bruha (n 96) 119 (in fn. 79). For a different view, see SM Stefánsson ‘State Liability in
Community Law and EEA Law’ in C Baudenbacher et al (eds), The EFTA Court Ten Years On
(Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 2005) 145, 154.
114 Case C-172/99 Oy Liikenne [2001] ECR I-745, para 21.
115 Cases C-236/01 Monsanto Agricoltura [2003] ECR I-8105, para 106 and C-192/01
Commisson v Denmark [2003] ECR I-9693, paras 47–53.
The EFTA Court 15 Years On 753
Union is extended to the EFTA States’, the ECJ stated that ‘(i)t is for the
Court, in that context, to ensure that the rules of the EEA Agreement which are
identical in substance to those of the Treaty are interpreted uniformly within
the Member States.’116 The ECJ made no mention at all of Opinion 1/91, but
referred instead to the discussion of the EEA Agreement’s homogeneity
objective in the more EEA-friendly Opinion 1/92. The Austrian government
argued unsuccessfully that article 40 EEA should be interpreted in conformity
with former article 67(1) EC, with the consequence that subsequent ECJ case-
law relating to article 56 EC (now 64 TFEU) was without relevance.117
Rejecting this objection, AG Geelhoed stated inter alia that the EFTA Court in
Islandsbanki had implicitly based its findings on an interpretation of article 40
EEA in conformity with Article 56 EC.118 The ECJ, on the other hand, made
no issue at all of the change in the EC Treaty’s rules on capital following the
Treaty of Maastricht. It simply stated that article 40 EEA must be interpreted
in conformity with the ‘largely identical’ provisions of article 56 EC.119
The clarification in Ospelt was followed up in the following year in Bellio
F.lli. The EFTA Court had already availed itself of the opportunity to refer to
Ospelt in the E-1/03 ESA v Iceland and Ásgeirsson cases. The ECJ followed
up by stating that ‘both the Court and the EFTA Court have recognized
the need to ensure that the rules of the EEA Agreement which are identical in
substance to those of the Treaty are interpreted uniformly.’120 The ECJ added
that article 13 EEA (on the right to place restrictions on the free movement of
goods) is identical in substance to article 30 EC (now 36 TFEU).
In the subsequent judgments in Keller Holding and C-345/05 Commission v
Portugal from 2006 and C-104/06 Commission v Sweden from 2007, the ECJ
assumed without further discussion that the provisions of the EEA Agreement
on the free movement of capital and freedom of establishment in articles 28
and 31 must also be interpreted in conformity with articles 39 and 43 EC (now
45 and 49 TFEU).121 A corresponding statement regarding the free movement
of services (article 36 EEA/article 49 EC (now 56 TFEU)) was made in the
judgment in C-522/04 Commission v Belgium from 2007.122 In the same year,
the ECJ commented briefly in Ludwigs-Apotheke that the rules in articles 11
and 13 EEA on the free movement of goods are ‘essentially identical’ to those
116 Case C-452/01 Ospelt [2003] ECR I-9743, para 29.
117 See the summary of the submissions from the Austrian government in AG Geelhoed’s
opinion, para 65.
118 Opinion in Ospelt (n 116) para 73 (cf fn 32).
119 Ospelt (n 116) para 32. See also cases C-521/07 Commisson v the Netherlands, judgment of
11.6.2009 (nyr), para 33; C-526/07 Commission v Spain, judgment of 6.10.2009 (nyr), para 67 and
C-540/07 Commission v Italy, judgment of 19.11.2009 (nyr), paras 65–67.
120 Case C-286/02 Bellio F.lli [2004] ECR I-3465, para 34.
121 Cases C-471/04 Keller Holding [2006] ECR I-2107, paras 48–49; C-345/05 Commisson v
Portugal [2006] ECR I-10633, paras 40–41; C-104/06 Commisson v Sweden [2007] ECR I-671,
paras 32–33.
122 Case C-522/04 Commisson v Belgium [2007] ECR I-5701, paras 44–45. Similarly case
C-153/08 Commission v Spain, judgment of 6.10.2009 (nyr), paras 48–49.
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laid down by articles 28 and 30 EC (now 34 and 36 TFEU), with the conse-
quence that the conflict found between Community law and a provision in the
German law on medicinal products could be transferred directly to EEA
law.123
All in all, post-Ospelt case-law leaves us with the clear impression that the
ECJ’s attitude to the EEA structure has changed from considerable scepticism
to recognition that it is actually possible to realise the objective of the par-
ticipation of the EFTA States in the internal market.124
In parallel with this change in attitude, references to EFTA Court case-law
have gradually evolved into what can only be described as a dialogue between
the two EEA courts. By way of example, in 2004 a further reference was made
to Kellogg’s in case C-41/02, Commission v the Netherlands;125 and the
Ahokainen case from 2006 included the reference to Restamark that had been
absent nine years earlier in Franzén.126 In the Grand Chamber judgment in
Fidium Finanz in the same year, the ECJ referred to the EFTA Court judgment
in Íslandsbanki to support its understanding that in cases relating to both the
freedom to provide services and the free movement of capital, a restriction
should be considered against the fundamental freedom that is mainly affec-
ted.127 In addition to this, we also have the aforementioned judgment
Boehringer Ingelheim II from 2007, in which the ECJ explicitly concurred
with the EFTA Court’s interpretation of the Trademark Directive in
Paranova.128
This impression of a dialogue between the ECJ and the EFTA Court is
reinforced if we also include the Advocates General in our assessment.129
Since the brief reference by AG Lenz to Lego/Mattel in case C-222/94,
Commission v United Kingdom, the Advocates General have so far referred to
EFTA Court case-law in 33 different cases.130 Here too the dialogue seems to
be growing over time—26 out of a total of 33 references are from cases since
the turn of the millennium.
123 Case C-143/06 Ludwigs-Apotheke [2007] ECR I-9623, para 43. See further case C-265/06
Commisson v Portugal [2008] ECR I-2245, paras 29–30.
124 However, in some cases, homogeneity may be hindered by the unfortunate fact that not all
Community law provisions of relevance for the proportionality assessment of national restrictions
on the fundamental freedoms are part of EEA law, see the recent judgment Commission v Italy
(n 119) paras 68–76.
125 Case C-41/02 Commisson v the Netherlands [2004] ECR I-11375, para 62.
126 Case C-434/04 Ahokainen [2006] ECR I-9171, para 20.
127 Case C-452/04 Fidium Finanz [2006] ECR I-9521, para 34.
128 Boehringer Ingelheim II (n 88) para 38.
129 See in detail C Baudenbacher ‘The EFTA Court, the ECJ, and the Latter’s Advocates
General—a Tale of Judicial Dialogue’ in A Arnull et al (eds) Continuity and Change in EU Law:
Essays in Honour of Sir Francis Jacobs (OUP, Oxford, 2008) 90–122.
130 Case C-222/94 Commisson v UK [1996] ECR I-4025, para 3 (in fn 4). The number of
references appears if searching for ‘EFTA Court’ in the category ‘Advocate General’s opinion’ in
the EUR-Lex database (http://eur-lex.europa.eu).
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Regarding the ECJ’s willingness to engage in dialogue with other inter-
national courts, it may be claimed that its volte-face after Opinion 1/91 already
happened in P v S from 1996, in which the ECJ made its first reference to the
case-law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).131 Once the ECJ
had relinquished its opposition in principle to allowing itself to be influenced
by the case-law of other courts, it would appear somewhat contrived if it were
not also to take account of EFTA Court case-law.132 Although the EFTA
Court was probably helped along by the growing dialogue between the
ECJ and the ECtHR, the ECJ’s frequent references to EFTA Court case-law
nonetheless manifest clear recognition of the EFTA Court. In view of the
ECJ’s fairly evident change of opinion about the EEA Agreement in the same
period, it appears probable that the EFTA Court’s dynamic and integration
friendly interpretation has been a contributory factor.
VI. THE CONSEQUENCES: A MORE ‘SUPRANATIONAL’ EEA LAW AND AN UNEXPECTED
CONTRIBUTION TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF EU LAW
From the point of view of the EFTA States, part of the price they have to pay
for the EFTA Court’s dynamic interpretation is a more ‘supranational’ EEA
Agreement than originally conceived. As regards State liability, the EFTA
Court can even be said to have gone further in Sveinbjörnsdóttir than would
probably have been the case had the issue been submitted to the ECJ instead:
In light of Opinion 1/91, it seems rather doubtful that the ECJ in 1998 would
have derived a principle of State liability from the EEA Agreement. Given
that the right of national courts to refer questions of EEA law to the EFTA
Court under article 34 SCA was established because the EFTA States, in
consideration of their sovereignty, did not wish to open up for preliminary
judgments from the ECJ, this is somewhat paradoxical.
Moreover, in some cases, the EFTA Court’s interpretation of the EEA
Agreement appears to have influenced the underlying EU law. On the factual
level, this is clearly the case where EFTA Court judgments trigger subsequent
cases in ECJ—for instance when the English Court of Appeal in Boehringer
Ingelheim II asked the ECJ whether the EFTA Court’s interpretation of the
Trademark Directive in Paranova was correct, and when Fokus Bank led the
Dutch Gerechtshof te Amsterdam and the German Bundesfinanzhof respect-
ively to refer Amurta and Burda to the ECJ.133
Whether the EFTA Court has also influenced EU law on the judicial level is
more controversial. However, it seems improbable that the ECJ would refer to
131 Case C-13/94 P v S [1996] ECR I-2143, para 16.
132 See, in general, M Bronckers ‘The relationship of the EC courts with other international
tribunals: Non-committal, respectful or submissive?’ (2007) 44 CMLR 601–627.
133 Cases Boehringer Ingelheim II (n 88); C-379/05 Amurta [2007] I-9569 and C-284/06
Burda [2008] ECR I-4571, see further Baudenbacher (n 63) 109–111.
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EFTA Court case-law purely out of courtesy. It is certainly true that the
ECJ refers to EFTA Court case-law primarily in cases where it agrees with
the EFTA Court’s conclusions, but this is also very much the situation when
the ECJ’s refers to its own cases. In addition to this, the ECJ’s President,
Vassilious Skouris, has described the dialogue between the ECJ and the EFTA
Court as ‘a paradigm for international cooperation between judicial institu-
tions’ and stated that ‘ignoring EFTA Court precedents would simply be
incompatible with the overriding objective of the EEA Agreement which
is homogeneity’.134 Similarly, the former president of the ECJ’s Second
Chamber, Christiaan Timmermans, has pointed out that the two EEA courts,
through their references to each other are ‘more than paying a courteous salute
to the development of each other’s case-law’.135
A major finding of the present review is that the EFTA Court does not shy
away from taking a leading role in the dynamic development of EEA law.
However, it should be emphasised that there is no reason to claim that the
EFTA Court is in principle a more unreserved supporter of the free market
than is the ECJ. When the result nonetheless seems to be that the EFTA Court
tends, in hard cases, to follow an even more integration-friendly line than the
ECJ, this is presumably mainly due to structural imbalances between the two
EEA courts. One should probably be wary of suggesting that the EFTA Court
suffers from a ‘little brother complex’, but its case-law leaves one with the
inescapable impression that it is striving for recognition from the ECJ. One
way of attracting attention would be to take the lead in the development
towards further realization of the fundamental freedoms of the common
market. The present article shows that it is primarily in such cases that the ECJ
and its Advocates General see fit to highlight EFTA Court case-law, a fact
which the EFTA Court must surely have noticed.
Further, it is possible that the EFTA Court’s desire to prove its indepen-
dence from the EFTA States has caused it to be even more immune to
the arguments of government lawyers than the ECJ. Moreover, one cannot
exclude the fear of possible ECJ reactions to imbalances between the
Contracting Parties’ obligations (remember Polydor and Kupferberg) is a
factor leading the EFTA Court to (perhaps unconsciously) insert a certain
‘safety margin’ into its interpretation of EEA law. Should the ECJ sub-
sequently prove to be more sympathetic to the arguments of EU Member
States, the only price paid would be that the EFTA States’ political latitude
would in the meantime have been made subject to greater restrictions
than required under EEA law. From the point of view of the EU, this is far
134 V Skouris ‘The ECJ and the EFTA Court under the EEA Agreement: A Paradigm for
International Cooperation between Judicial Institutions’, in C Baudenbacher et al (eds) The EFTA
Court Ten Years On (Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland, Oregon 2005) 123–129.
135 C Timmermans, ‘Creative Homogeniety’ in M Johansson et al (eds) Festschrift Sven
Norberg (Bruylant, Brussels, 2006) 471–484.
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preferable to a reverse scenario, in which the EFTA Court would accept
national restrictions on the fundamental freedoms of the EEA Agreement
which should have been disallowed pursuant to subsequent ECJ case-law.
For the EFTA States, on the other hand, the paradoxical consequence is that it
appears harder to succeed with arguments for a ‘State-friendly’ solution in the
EFTA Court than in the ECJ.
In conclusion, the key question is whether the EFTA Court’s dynamic
interpretation of the EEA Agreement has been necessary to disprove the
15-year-long rumour of the Agreement’s imminent demise. This is a coun-
terfactual question to which there is no clear answer. The above analysis
does, however, show that the EFTA Court itself must have considered that
a dynamic approach was necessary to convince the ECJ that its earlier
evaluation in Opinion 1/91 was far too pessimistic. One may, however, also
assume that the EFTA States must have thought that the EEA Agreement
would have survived even if the EFTA Court had taken a less dynamic line—
they would scarcely have argued for a more traditional international law
approach in several of the aforementioned cases had they thought that such a
development would jeopardise the whole Agreement.
The EFTA States may well be correct in assuming that the EEA Agreement
would have survived even if it had been interpreted to a greater extent as a
traditional free trade agreement, but the result would be a wholly different
agreement from the one we have today. An evolution of the EEA Agreement
in line with the ECJ’s predictions in Opinion 1/91 and the EFTA States’
arguments before the EFTA Court would have resulted in differences between
EEA law and the underlying EU law which would have jeopardized the goal
of integrating the EFTA States into the internal market. We must deduce from
the present review that a great deal of the credit for the fact that this has not
happened is due to the EFTA Court.136 Whether the EFTA Court will be able
to preserve homogeneity between EU law and EEA law in the future is,
however, a very different question.137
VII. POSTSCRIPT: THE FUTURE OF THE EFTA COURT
From time to time, the EFTA States complain that the EFTA Court is too
dynamic and has gained too much power. Government lawyers regularly
argue before Norwegian courts against the wishes of private parties to refer
questions of interpretation to the EFTA Court. Further, the right to appear
before the ECJ in EEA-related cases is sometimes used to try to undermine
136 Similarly Tobler et al (n 1) 8, where the success of the EEAmodel is ‘in particular’ ascribed
to ‘the integrationist approach applied by the EFTA Court’.
137 cf the somewhat troubling prospects offered by the ECJ’s interpretation of EEA law in the
recent judgment Commission v Italy (n 119) as well as AG Jääskinen in the pending case C-72/09
Rimbaud, opinion of 29.4.2010.
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unwelcome decisions by the EFTA Court.138 Nor have Norwegian authorities
shown any interest in extending the EFTA Court’s jurisdiction to embrace
further aspects of the EFTA States’ association with the EU, such as the
Schengen Agreement or the new Lugano Convention. It must be said,
however, that Norwegian authorities have at the same time loyally adhered to
EFTA Court case-law—even where the latter’s interpretation of the EEA
Agreement is contrary to Norwegian preconditions when the Agreement was
signed. Although it is tempting to explain this obedience in terms of Protestant
duty ethics, it is probably more correct to view it as pragmatic recognition of
the extremely uneven relative strength between the EU and the EFTA States:
Norwegian authorities seek to avoid open confrontation with the EFTA Court
because of possible reactions from the EU.139
From the EU perspective, objections from the EFTA States are a sure sign
that the EFTA Court is successfully filling its role as an independent court of
justice (see article 108 of the EEA Agreement). Experience of the EFTA Court
since 1994 up until the present day is thus a weighty argument in favour of
corresponding court solutions in the EU’s other association agreements with
third countries. The EU seems to have recognised this as, when considering its
relationship with Switzerland, it advocated an EEA-style framework agree-
ment with a ‘mechanism for [. . .] homogeneous interpretation of the rules’.140
If the ongoing negotiations on Iceland’s EU membership should produce
an outcome that is acceptable to the Icelandic electorate, the question
may arise as to whether an EEA Agreement with only Norway and the min-
istate of Liechtenstein left in the EFTA camp would justify the continuation
of a separate EFTA Court. From Norway’s point of view, a ‘Swiss model’
might prima facie seem an alluring option. In this model, Switzerland’s
own courts are charged with interpreting the country’s extensive bilateral
agreements with the EU. However, the indications are that Swiss courts
operate with a less dynamic approach than the ECJ.141 This does not only
leave this alternative less attractive from the EU’s point of view. Following
the reciprocity consideration pursued in this article, it might also lead to a
less EEA friendly response from the ECJ.142 Given that it seems neither
138 See eg, Candolin (n 92) paras 25 ff.
139 Tellingly, the Norwegian government, which in Sveinbjörnsdóttir (n 23) and Karlsson
(n 28) argued passionately before the EFTA Court against the existence of a principle of State
liability in EEA law, gave up its resistance when the question was raised before Norwegian courts
in the case Finanger II, cf [2005] Report of the Norwegian Supreme Court 1365.
140 Council doc. 1665/1/08 Rev I (5.12.2008), paras 29 and 32.
141 Lazowski (n 1) 1443–1444.
142 From the perspective of reciprocity, it is certainly tempting to see the ECJ’s recent
judgment in case C-351/08 Grimme, judgment of 12.11.2009 (nyr) as a response to the apparent
reluctance of the Swiss’ courts to interpret the bilateral agreements with the same dynamism as
does the EFTA Court interpret EEA law. Referring to Polydor (n 8), the ECJ held that the
interpretation given to provisions of EU law cannot be automatically applied by analogy to the
interpretation of the bilateral Agreement between the EU and Switzerland on the free movement
of persons.
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constitutionally nor politically possible for Norway to submit to the jurisdic-
tion of the ECJ, it will hardly be possible to retain the EEA Agreement without
the perpetuation of the arrangement with an independent EFTA Court as an
guarantor of the EFTA States’ fulfilment of their obligations under the
Agreement.
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